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WHITHER THE WITNESS? THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT'S SPECIAL DUTY OF PROTECTION
IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AFTER
PIECHOWICZ v. UNITED STATES
The citizen witness' is an indispensable part of criminal prosecution. Without witnesses, the rudiments of prosecution, such as
identifying the accused and establishing the requisite nexus between
the accused and the crime, would become insurmountable obstacles
to conviction, and the criminal justice system would cease to
function.
Unfortunately, the importance of citizen testimony breeds further criminal conduct by defendants awaiting trial who attempt to
avoid conviction by intimidating and killing prosecution witnesses.
Such crude attempts to circumvent the judicial process should spur
the government to protect threatened federal criminal witnesses.
Recognizing the crucial role witnesses' play in the criminal justice
system, the government must bear the burden of witness protection
to foster effective citizen participation in the criminal process.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, held in
Piechowicz v. United States2 that the federal government has no obligation to protect a federal criminal witness3 whose life is threatened
prior to trial because of his scheduled testimony. The court relied
on the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) to bar a wrongful death action against the United States
brought by the survivors of a murdered federal criminal witness left
unprotected by federal authorities. 4 The Piechowicz court failed to
recognize a special governmental duty to protect federal criminal
witnesses that arises from the involuntary nature of the governmentwitness relationship. By subpoenaing a citizen to testify, the government unilaterally forces a citizen into an involuntary relationship
harboring potentially grave consequences. 5
1 "Citizen witness" denotes a nonexpert, non-law enforcement individual summoned to testify for the prosecution. Furthermore, because the English language lacks
an appropriate gender-neutral pronoun referring to persons in the singular, this Note
uses "he" to describe a witness, rather than using the more cumbersome "he/she" or,
alternatively, switching to and fro between "he" and "she."
2 885 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989).
3 The term "federal criminal witness" describes a citizen subpoenaed to testify for
the government in a federal criminal prosecution. This Note does not discuss the protection of state criminal witnesses because Piechowicz only addressed the question of federal witness protection.
4 Piechowicz, 885 F.2d at 1209.
5 This Note addresses only involuntary situations where a citizen is compelled to
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This Note argues that principles of reciprocity, special relationships, and knowledge of a third party's dangerous violent tendencies create a special governmental duty-arising from the
involuntary nature of the government-witness relationship-to protect threatened federal criminal witnesses. This duty vitiates governmental discretion otherwise immunized by the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA. As background, Part I of this Note
discusses the evolution of case law construing the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA and concludes that this exception
does not immunize the government from liability for failing to protect threatened witnesses. Part II discusses Piechowicz v. United States.
Part III examines the three complementary legal doctrines of special
relationships, reciprocity, and knowledge that, taken separately and
cumulatively, establish a special governmental duty to protect
threatened witnesses. This Note concludes that a breach of the duty
of protection entitles injured federal criminal witnesses and the survivors of murdered federal criminal witnesses to a remedy at law.
Recognizing this special duty to protect threatened federal criminal
witnesses would remove existing incentives for perjury, 6 foster
greater governmental accountability, and establish a more effective
criminal justice system.
I
BACKGROUND

A.

The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act

Congress ostensibly designed the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FT'CA) as a general waiver of sovereign immunity with express exceptions through which the government may retain immunity. 7 The
statute provides that the United States is liable for money damages
for "personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment."'8 Prior to the FTCA,
plaintiffs pursued claims against the government through private retestify and does not address the question of whether a special duty arises, for example,

when a citizen, of his own volition, dials the emergency number "911."
6

Under the current system, an unprotected witness has an incentive to commit

perjury if he believes it necessary to save his life or the lives of others.
7 Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort
ClaimsAct, 57 GEO. LJ. 81, 82 (1968). Black's Law Dictionary defines sovereign immunity
as a doctrine which "precludes [a] litigant from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause
of action against a sovereign or a party with sovereign attributes." BLACK'S LAw DicTIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
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lief bills, 9 a lengthy and protracted process that burdened Congress
with literally thousands of claims and denied deserving plaintiffs access to the judicial system. 10 By enacting the FTCA, Congress
sought to give citizens an equitable judicial forum for the prosecution of claims against the government."
Congress was nevertheless reluctant to abrogate the doctrine of
sovereign immunity entirely, fearing that a complete lack of immunity would effectively disable government by subjecting governmental action to unwarranted judicial scrutiny.' 2 The discretionary
function exception, then, was intended to immunize vital governmental decisionmaking from the threat of legal action. The provision excepts from liability:
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government ...

based upon the exercise or performance or the

failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.' 3
Congress felt that executive and legislative branch autonomy had to
be preserved; the wisdom of discretionary governmental actions
14
could not be challenged by tort suits.
9 Pursuing claims through private relief bills required members of Congress to
introduce legislation through which individual claimants would be specifically compensated. Reynolds, supra note 7, at 81.
10

Id.

11 HearingsBefore the Joint Comm. on the Organization of Congress Pursuant to H.R. Con.
Res. 18, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 67-69 (1945).
12
H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6 (1945). Legislative history of the
FTCA states that the discretionary function exception "is a highly important exception
intended to preclude any possibility that the bill might be construed to authorize suit for
damages against the government growing out of an authorized activity." Id. Congress
also did not intend for the Act to allow claimants to obtain remedies for negligently
performed acts involving an abuse of discretion. Id.; see United States v. S.A. Empresa
de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984) (dual objectives of the FTCA and discretionary function exception are to provide a more expedient
forum for redress of injuries than private bills of relief, and to protect "certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals"); see also Daniel E. Matthews, Federal Tort ClaimsAct-The Proper Scope of the DiscretionaryFunction Exception, 6 AM.
U.L. REV. 22, 23-24 (1957) (discussing the rationale for the discretionary function exception); Reynolds, supra note 7, at 83-84 (discussing the purpose of the discretionary
function exception); Note, Municipal Tort Liabilityfor Failureto Provide Adequate Police Protection in New York State, 39 ALB. L. REV. 599, 602-03 (1975) (authored by Bruce Blatchly)
[hereinafter Note, Municipal Tort Liability] (noting opposition to judicial scrutiny of administrative decisions); Note, Police Liabilityfor Negligent Failureto Prevent Crime, 94 HARv.
L. REV. 821, 832-33 (1981) (addressing argument that courts cannot determine the reasonableness of complex governmental activities).
13 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
14 Hearings on H.R. 5373 & 6463 Before the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess., ser. 13, at 29 (1942) [hereinafter Hearingson H.R. 5373 & 6463]; see Reynolds,
supra note 7, at 83 (discussing testimony of Assistant United States Attorney General
Shea); see also In re joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 891 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1989)
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B. Judicial Application of the Discretionary Function Exception
The discretionary function exception initially received
favorable reviews from commentators. 15 Most assumed the
exception simply codified existing judicial distinctions between
compensable ministerial government actions and noncompensable
policymaking actions, 16 and reaffirmed a judicial unwillingness to
pass judgment on the soundness of governmental action.1 7 The
seemingly innocuous exception soon proved incapable of precise
definition, however, and prompted one commentator to say that the
"vague and ambiguous" discretionary function exception was a
"monstrous joker.., threatening to engulf the entire [Federal Tort
Claims] Act in a twilight zone."' 18
In 1953 the Supreme Court first addressed the discretionary
function exception in Dalehite v. United States.' 9 Dalehite involved an
explosion of fertilizer with an ammonium nitrate base that the government had decided to store in vessels in a Texas harbor prior to
exportation. 20 The Court determined that because the decision to
export fertilizer occurred at Cabinet level, all subsequent action in
furtherance of the fertilizer policy fell within the discretionary function exception and rendered the government immune from liability. 2 ' In dissent, Justice Jackson noted that "the ancient and
discredited doctrine that '[t]he King can do no wrong'... has merely
been amended to read, '[t]he King can do only little wrongs.'"22
Justice Jackson's point is well taken. A strict reading of Dalehite immunizes any government action if a court decides that negligence
23
initially occurred at a policy level.
("The wellspring of the discretionary function exception is the doctrine of separation of
powers.... [P]rinciples of separation of powers mandate that the judiciary refrain from
deciding questions consigned to the concurrent branches of the government." (citing
Caban v. United States, 671 F.2d 1230, 1233 (2d Cir. 1982))).
15 Matthews, supra note 12, at 23; see also Irvin M. Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims
Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEO. LJ. 1, 44 (1946) (stating that the exception was
essential to the preservation of effective government).
16
Matthews, supra note 12, at 23-24; see also Gottlieb, supra note 15, at 44; Reynolds,
supra note 7, at 84.
17 Hearings on H.R. 5373 & 6463, supra note 14, at 29 (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Shea); see Reynolds, supra note 7, at 84 (discussing Shea's testimony).
18
Hugh Stromswold, The Twilight Zone of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 4 AM. U.L. REv.
41, 42 (1955).
19 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
20 Id. at 17.
21

Id. at 40.

22 Id. at 60 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
23 Consider, for example, a governmental program to export wheat to Ethiopia.
Under Dalehite, governmental decisions to subsidize only a certain percentage of farmers, to use toxic fertilizers, and to store the grain in a hazardous manner-as in Dalehitewould be immunized from liability, because those decisions would be incident and necessary to the furtherance of the governmental scheme. Or, to use an oft-cited example,
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Two years later, the Court in Indian Towing Co. v. United States 24
narrowed the breadth of Dalehite, holding the Coast Guard liable for
negligently operating a lighthouse.2 5 The plaintiff, a barge owner,
alleged that his tugboat went aground because the Coast Guard
failed to repair a malfunctioning lighthouse light. 26 The government sought immunity on the basis that it had undertaken a
"uniquely governmental function." 2 7 The Court rejected the
claimed immunity and, in finding that the decision to provide lighthouse service triggered a governmental duty to use due care, held
the government to the same standard of reasonable care as a private
person.2 8 Although arguably Indian Towing did not directly involve
the discretionary function exception, the decision's more "liberal attitude" 29 toward FTCA liability offered a narrower alternative to
30
Dalehite's definition of the discretionary function exception.
More recently, in Berkovitz v. United States,3 1 the Supreme Court
held that the discretionary function exception did not bar a claim
alleging that the government negligently approved production and
distribution of an oral polio vaccine. 3 2 The Court labeled the government's conduct nondiscretionary and articulated a two-part test
for determining whether governmental action falls within the discretionary function exception. First, in examining the nature of the
challenged conduct, a court must determine if the action involved
perhaps an auto accident involving an Agriculture Department official en route to an
export program meeting would not be actionable either. And, even if the government
were liable in this example, it is nevertheless a "little wrong."
24
350 U.S. 61 (1955).
25 Id
26 Id. at 62.
27 Id. at 64. A "uniquely governmental function", the government argued, was an
activity "which private persons do not perform." Id. The government conceded that the
operation of the lighthouse was not a discretionary governmental activity because it took
place at the so-called "operational level" of activity and did not entail the requisite
amount of discretionary activity to warrant application of the discretionary function exception. Id. However, the government argued that uniquely governmental functions,
because they are inherently different from ordinary actions, should not be subject to tort
liability.
28 Id.
29 Reynolds, supra note 7, at 101.
30
See, e.g., id. (Indian Towing results in governmental liability whenever there is a
duty to act, and a duty to act eliminates discretion); Note, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 167, 170
(1956) (Indian Towing significantly expands federal liability beyond the narrow restrictions of Dalehite). In addition, some commentators feel that Indian Towing narrows sovereign immunity because it holds government to the same standard of reasonable care
as a private person. See, e.g. Reynolds, supra note 7, at 101; Note, FederalTort Claims ActA Liberalized Interpretation, 35 NEB. L. REV. 509, 511 (1956) (authored by Charles K.
Thompson) (Indian Towing imposes liability for uniquely governmental functions if a private person could conceivably undertake the same function).
31
486 U.S. 531 (1988).
32
Id. at 532.
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an element of judgment or choice.3 3 A government official has no
discretion if a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically enumerates a course of conduct.3 4 In the absence of a specific directive,
conduct may be discretionary if there is room for judgment or
choice. Second, if the action is sufficiently imbued with discretion to
satisfy the first part of the Berkovitz test, then a court must determine
if the judgment underlying the challenged action was based on public policy considerations.3 5 "Public policy," according to the Court,
encompasses social, economic, and political policy because Congress enacted the FTCA to protect legislative and administrative decisions in those areas.3 6 Therefore, according to Berkovitz, the
discretionary function exception applies only to actions that involve
judgments or choices based on public policy considerations. The
two-part Berkovitz test distinguishes ordinary, non-policy discretionary action from the type of higher order discretionary action that the
discretionary function exception was intended to immunize from
tort liability. As the Court stated in Westfall v. Erwin,3 7 "virtually all
official acts involve some modicum of choice," 3 8 and to immunize
such basic discretionary action from tort liability would result in a
"wooden interpretation" 39 of the discretionary function exception. 40 Discretionary choices exist at all levels of government, but
not all such choices warrant immunity from tort liability. Immunizing basic discretionary action from tort liability creates the "twilight
zone" 4 1 feared by commentators writing at the time of the exception's promulgation.
Berkovitz's application to cases involving the negligent release of
mental patients from government hospitals illustrates the discretionary function exception's intended effect. In Smart v. United
States, 42 a pre-Berkovitz case, the Tenth Circuit held that the governlidat 536.
Id. For example, if, as in Berkovitz, a Federal Drug Administration policy requires
investigation of all lots of oral polio vaccine, the government has no discretion to fail to
inspect a particular lot.
35 Id. at 537.
36 Id. In United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813-14 (1984), the Court
emphasized the type of conduct in issue in applying the discretionary function exception. In Varig, the Court said that "[itis the nature of the conduct, rather than the status
of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given
case." Id. at 813. A court must determine if the challenged acts are of the "nature and
quality" intended to be immunized from tort liability.
37 484 U.S. 292 (1988).
38 Id. at 298.
39 Id.
40
Westfall involved an application of the qualified immunity doctrine under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. However, under the discretionary function exception, both § 1983 and
non-§ 1983 analyses use the same definition of discretion.
41
See Stromswold, supra note 18.
42
207 F.2d 841 (10th Cir. 1953).
33
34
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ment was not liable for injuries caused by a discharged mental pa-

tient who recklessly drove a stolen automobile, because the decision
to release "of necessity involve[d] the exercise ofjudgment and dis-

cretion" falling within the ambit of the discretionary function exception.48 However, in two post-Berkovitz decisions, the First Circuit, in

Collazo v. United States,44 and the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois in Mayer v. United States,4 5 concluded
that the negligent release of a mental patient from government custody is not protected by the discretionary function exception. Both
Collazo and Mayer found that the decision to release, though discretionary, is insufficiently policy-based to implicate the discretionary
46
function exception.
Although courts have struggled to define the parameters of the
discretionary function exception, 4 7 Berkovitz clarifies discretionary
function analysis and emphasizes that discretionary actions in furtherance of policy are not immune from liability, absent an inherent
public policy basis. In In re Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation,4 8 for example, the United States District Court for the Eastprn
District of New York held that chartering a national bank and subsequently declaring insolvency is protected by the exception, but negligently operating a bank is not immune from liability. 4 9 In Greene v.
Id at 842-43.
850 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988).
45 No. 89-C-3468 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist File).
46
Collazo, 850 F.2d at 2; Mayer, No. 89-C-3468 at 10 (LEXIS paging).
47
See FDIC v. Irwin, 916 F.2d 1051, 1053 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The drafters of the
FTCA failed to define the term 'discretionary function,' and decades of litigation have
yet to yield a clear demarcation between actionable torts and immune discretion."); Estate of Gleason v. United States, 857 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir. 1988) (The discretionary
function exception is not "rigidly defined."); Ayer v. United States, 721 F. Supp. 1395,
1396 (D. Me. 1989) ("The definition of 'discretionary function' has given the courts a
great deal of trouble."), af'd, 902 F.2d 1038 (1st Cir. 1990).
Some courts have adhered to a strict operational-planning level distinction. See, e.g.,
Madison v. United States, 679 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1982); Gross v. United States, 676 F.2d
295 (8th Cir. 1982); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 841; Doyle v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 1278 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Social Sec.
Admin. Baltimore Federal Credit Union v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md.
1956). Other courts have looked to statutes authorizing discretionary activity. See, e.g.,
Lynch v. United States Dep't of Army Corps of Engr's, 543 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. Cal
1982); Smith v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 867 (D. Mich 1971). Other criteria that
courts have used in attempting to define the discretionary function exception include
the "nature and quality" of challenged governmental action, see, e.g., Downs v. United
States, 522 F.2d 990, 991 (6th Cir. 1975); whether the activity involved a balancing of
policy considerations, see, e.g., J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. United States, 515 F.2d 97
(5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 520 F.2d 943, cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976); and whether political policy considerations were involved, see, e.g., Monarch Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, 353 F. Supp. 1249 (D.D.C. 1973).
48
445 F. Supp. 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
49
Id. at 735.
48

44
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United States,50 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that after deciding to construct a stairwell in
an office building, the government's duty to use due care mandated
installation of a handrail.5 1 These cases interpreting the discretionary function exception stand for the general proposition that once a
policy decision is made, the government owes a duty of care to third
persons who may act in reliance on governmental action taken in
furtherance of the decision. In other words, the government makes
some discretionary decisions that lack a sufficient policy basis to
warrant immunity under the exception.
The foregoing suggests that, while the initial decision to subpoena a witness may be immunized by the discretionary function
exception under Berkovitz, after subpoenaing a witness the government has no discretion to decide whether or not to offer protection.
The decision to protect witnesses is simply not grounded in a sufficiently justifiable economic, social, or political policy to be immunized under the discretionary function exception. Moreover,
principles of special relationships, reciprocity, and knowledge of a
third party's violent tendencies further support a nondiscretionary
duty to protect threatened federal criminal witnesses.
C.

Governmental Liability Based on a Special Duty Owed to
Witnesses

The government owes subpoenaed witnesses a special duty of
protection-triggered by the government's knowledge of a threat to
witness safety-stemming from the special relationship between
government and witness and from principles of reciprocity. A special relationship, reciprocity, and knowledge cumulatively create a
special duty of protection that removes governmental action from
the realm of immunized discretion.
1. Special Relationship
Tort law has long recognized that a special relationship between two parties gives rise to an affirmative duty to act. 52 In the
50

745 F. Supp. 1486 (E.D. Mo. 1990).

51

Id. at 1492-93; see also Caraballo v. United States, 830 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1987)

(United States Park Service has a duty to use due care when patrolling a public beach
after deciding to patrol); Eklof Marine Corp v. United States, 762 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.

1985) (decision to employ a navigational aid is discretionary, but decision as to number
or location of navigational aids is not discretionary).
52

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315-320 (1977) [hereinafter RE-

STATEMENT]; W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 56 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER
AND KEETON]; see also Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Excusing Governmental Unitfrom Tort

Liability on Theory That Genera Not Particular, Duty Was Owed Under Circumstances, 38
A.L.R.4th 1194 (1985).
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absence of such a duty or special circumstance, a person owes no
duty of care toward another.5 3 The existence of a special relationship, however, negates the "no duty" rule and imposes liability on a

party who fails to exercise the duty of care arising from this special
relationship. 5 4 As the Restatement (Second) of Torts notes, "there is no
duty to control the conduct of a third person ... unless a special
relation exists between the actor and the other which gives rise to
the other a right of protection."5 5 Special relationships imposing
56
liability on a party for failing to act include innkeeper-guest,
school-pupil, 5 7 university-fraternity,58 prison-inmate,5 9 mental
hospital-patient, 60 mortuary-survivors, 6 1 common carrier-passenger,62 stockbroker-investor, 63 corporate officer-shareholder, 64 tav53 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, §§ 315-320; PROSSER AND KEETON, supra
note 52, § 56; see also Annotation, supra note 52.
54 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 52; PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 52; see also

Annotation, supra note 52.
55
RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 315.
56 See Duckworth v. Appostalis, 208 F. 936 (D.C. Tenn. 1913) (innkeeper who knew
of employee's violent nature was liable for employee's assaults of guests); Garzilli v.
Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges, 419 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (special relationship between innkeeper and his guest imposed liability on innkeeper for failing to prevent rape of guest by third party; court upheld $2.5 million award to guest, entertainer
Connie Francis); Dye-Washburn Hotel Co. v. Aldridge, 207 Ala. 471, 93 So. 512 (1922)
(hotel is required to keep premises in safe condition and is liable for failing to do so).
57 See Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 840 (1990) (state liable for harm caused by sexually abusive teacher);
Pagano by Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Schools, 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(school officials liable for physical and verbal abuse of student by other students);
Lauricella v. Board of Educ., 52 A.D.2d 710, 381 N.Y.S.2d 566 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)
(school liable for injuries sustained by student thrown out of window by other students);
Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376, 470 P.2d
360 (1970) (school liable for death of student killed while slap-boxing with fellow student during lunch recess).
58 See Furek v. University of Del., C.A. No. 82C-SE-30, slip op. (Del. Super. Ct.
1986) (special relationship between university and fraternity imposed liability on university for injuries suffered by pledge during fraternity initiation).
59 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (special relationship between prison officials and inmates mandated the provision of adequate medical treatment to inmates),
reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066.
60
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (special relationship between state
institution and involuntarily committed mental patient required institution officials to
ensure patient's safety).
61
See Draper Mortuary v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 533, 185 Cal. Rptr. 396
(1982) (mortuary liable for mistreatment of corpse by third party because special relationship between survivors and mortuary imposed a duty of care upon the mortuary).
62 See Carroll v. Staten Island R.R., 58 N.Y. 126 (1874) (common carrier owed duty
to passengers to provide for their safety).
63
Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1990) (special relationship between stock-broker and his customers); Cant v. A.G. Becker and Co., 374 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Ill.
1974), supp. op., 379 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Ill. 1974), and supp. op., 384 F. Supp. 814 (N.D.
Ill.
1974) (special relationship between stockbroker and investor imposed liability on
stockbroker for failing to inform investor of stockbroker's changed status).
64
See Cauble v. White, 360 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. La. 1973) (special relationship be-
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ern owner-patron, 65 camp proprietor-camper, 6 6 state agency-foster
child, 6 7 union-employer, 68 and, this Note argues, should include
government-witness.
The Restatement recognizes that certain relationships demand a
particular duty of protection because of the unique character of
those relationships. The classic example of an innkeeper and his
guest illustrates the Restatement principle. An innkeeper owes no
duty of protection to the general public, but when a member of the
general public enters the innkeeper's inn a particular duty of protection arises. 69 The guest expects that once he entered into a relationship and surrendered a certain amount of control to the
innkeeper, the innkeeper would exercise reasonable care to protect
the guest from foreseeable harm.
Courts have attempted to create a workable definition of special
relationship. InJensen v. Conrad,70 the Fourth Circuit listed some of
the factors constituting a special relationship between a citizen and
the government. According to Jensen, this special relationship includes three factors: state custody of either the victim or the perpetrator of a crime at the time of or prior to the incident; an explicitly
stated desire to provide affirmative assistance to a particular class of
71
persons; and state knowledge of the claimant's plight.
More recently, the Supreme Court held in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services 72 that, in the absence of physical
tween corporation president and shareholders imposed increased liability on president
for misstatements to shareholders regarding potential takeover).
65 See Allen v. Babrab, Inc., 438 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1983) (tavern owner liable for
injuries suffered by tavern patron assaulted by third party in tavern parking lot).
66
See Wallace v. Der Ohanian, 199 Cal. App. 2d 141, 18 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1962)
(special relationship between proprietor of youth camp and 11-year-old camper imposed liability on proprietor for failing to prevent rape of camper).
67
See Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990) (special relationship between state agency responsible for care of abandoned children and
abandoned children placed in foster homes), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 182 (1990); Walker v.
Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (special relationship between foster home and
children placed in foster home), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
68
See Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1989) (special relationship between
maritime union and vessel employer), cert. granted sub. nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,
110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990).
69
See cases cited, supra note 56.
70
747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
71
Id. at 194-95; see also Fox v. Curtis, 712 F.2d 84, 87-88 (4th Cir. 1983) (courts
should consider, among other factors, whether a custodial relationship exists between a
citizen and the state, and whether the state is aware of a specific risk to a citizen).
Though bothJensen and Fox mention knowledge as an aspect of special relationships, this
Note addresses knowledge separately as part of the overall special governmental duty to
protect witnesses. Moreover, as is further demonstrated in this Part, there are definitions of special relationships that do not include knowledge as a criterion, but that nevertheless encompass the government-witness relationship.
72
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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custody, no special relationship existed between the State of Wisconsin and a child victimized by a physically abusive father.7 3 After
returning the child from state custody to his father, the state did not
intervene even though it suspected child abuse.7 4 A final beating by
75
the child's father left the child, Joshua DeShaney, brain damaged.
The Court said no special relationship existed because Joshua was
not in state custody when the beating occurred. 7 6 According to
DeShaney, a special relationship between citizen and government
exists solely when the government involuntary deprives a citizen of
his liberty.

77

A recent case interpreting DeShaney, however, held that a special
relationship exists between the government and an informant not in
state custody. In G-69 v. Degnan,78 the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey said that where both parties-the informant and the police-anticipate that discovery of an informant's
activities could endanger the informant's life, the state has assumed
a duty to protect the informant.7 9 Physical custody, the court said, is
unnecessary to establish a special relationship when the government
places citizens in a dangerous situation. 0
G-69 is consistent with so-called "snake pit" special relationship
cases that hold the government liable for failing to protect persons
that the government has placed in dangerous situations. As the Sev73
74
75

Id. at 194.
Id. at 192-93.
Id at 193.

Id. at 199-200.
Id. The Court held that only those persons involuntarily restrained from acting
on their own behalf are in a special relationship.
78
745 F. Supp. 254 (D.NJ. 1990).
79 Id. at 265.
80 Id. It should be noted that the G-69 court granted the plaintiff prospective injunctive relief but also granted the defendants, state Attorneys General, and other state
officials qualified immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability. The court's rationale for
granting qualified immunity was that the defendants could reasonably have believed that
their conduct did not violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights at the time. Id. at 264.
However, the court said that its grant of prospective injunctive relief "forecloses the
qualified immunity defense in similar cases from this date forward." Id.
It should also be noted that, in a footnote, G-69 attempted to distinguish Piechowicz
by implying that no special relationship existed in Piechowicz because there was no government offer of protective custody or relocation. Id. n.8. However, G-69 cites four
post-DeShan , cases to support a government-informant special relationship that does
not involve promises of custody or protection. Id. at 265 (citing Cornelius v. Town of
Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 356-57 (1 1th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1784
(1990); Pagano by Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Schools, 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y.
1989); Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989); and Dudosh v. City of Allentown,
722 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (E.D. Pa. 1989)). Moreover, because G-69 states that, in the
future, government officials cannot use qualified immunity as a defense in governmentwitness cases, thereby implying that witness protection is nondiscretionary, G-69's comparative treatment of Piechowicz is diminished.
76
77
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enth Circuit stated in Bowers v. DeVito,8 1
[i]f the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that
its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it
82
had thrown him into a snake pit.
Accordingly, several post-DeShaney cases have held that a noncustodial special relationship implicating a duty to protect arises between the government and persons imperiled by governmental
conduct. In Swader v. Virginia,8 3 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia distinguished DeShaney by the degree
of government involvement in creating the danger to a citizen8 4 and
held that the State of Virginia breached a duty to protect a prison
employee's daughter who was raped and murdered by a prison inmate.8 5 In DeShaney, Joshua DeShaney's father posed a threat irrespective of state involvement; Joshua DeShaney was in an otherwise
"free world" environment when his father abused him.8 6 In Swader,
the state effectively created danger to the decedent by requiring the
decedent's mother, with whom the decedent lived, to reside near the
penitentiary, and by failing to prevent inmates from venturing near
the decedent's home beyond the fenced-in portion of the penitentiary.8 7 The state, therefore, placed a citizen in a potentially dangerous situation in which she would not have been absent state action.
Similarly, in Stoneking v. BradfordArea School District,8 8 the Third
Circuit held that a special relationship existed between the state and
public school students that gave rise to a duty of protection.8 9 The
court held that because students were required by law to attend
school, they were in the "functional custody" of the state while at
school, and the state was responsible for their safety.9 0 Requiring
the victimized student in Stoneking to attend public school increased
the student's risk of sexual abuse by a teacher. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York reached a similar
686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 618; see also Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 722 (1st Cir.)
(courts should see whether the state has affirmatively placed citizens in a position of
danger in determining the existence of a special relationship), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882
(1986).
83
743 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1990).
81
82

84
85

Id.
Id.

Id. at 442.
Id. Swader also noted that Piechowicz failed to mention that the DeShaney Court
inadequately addressed the possible existence of a noncustodial special relationship in
responding to the DeShaney plaintiffs' argument that a special relationship existed even
in the absence of state action creating the danger in question.
88
882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 840 (1990).
89 Id. at 723-24.
86
87

90

Id.
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conclusion in Pagano by Paganov. MassapequaPublic Schools, 9 1 holding
that an elementary school owed a duty of care to protect its students
92
from physical attacks by other students.
In Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake,93 the Eleventh Circuit held
the government liable to a citizen kidnapped and injured by members of a prison work squad. 94 The court stated that the work
squad's presence under the guidance of state authorities created a
danger to nearby citizens and gave rise to a special governmental
duty of protection, even though the injured plaintiff was never in
96
the state's physical custody.9 5 Additionally, in Wood v. Ostrander,
the Ninth Circuit held the government liable for injuries that resulted when a policeman arrested an intoxicated driver of a car, impounded the vehicle, and left a female passenger stranded in a high
crime area where she was subsequently raped. 97 Although the passenger was not in police custody when she was raped, the policeman's actions sufficiently distinguished the victim from the general
public and established the requisite special relationship and special
duty of care. 98
Language in two pre-DeShaney witness protection cases supports the "snake pit" special relationship theory. In Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge,9 9 an Illinois appellate court held that police had
a duty to protect a witness injured by arrested individuals. 10 0 The
police placed the witness in danger by asking him to identify suspects at a crime scene. The court held that as a result of this collaboration, the police owed the witness a special duty to prevent assault
by the arrested persons. 1 0 1 The court observed that the "plaintiffwitness] was called into a position of peril by the police who allegedly knew that [the] defendant.., had previously been arrested...
and was capable of physical violence."' 1 2 As a result, the police assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care in protecting the plain714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
Id. at 642-43.
93 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1784 (1990).
94 Id at 358-59.
95 Id
96 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 341 (1990).
97 Id. at 586.
98 Id. at 590; see also White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (government
liable for injuries caused to children abandoned by police after father was arrested for
drag racing); Ward v. City of SanJose, 737 F. Supp. 1502, 1507 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (police
liable for failing to protect citizen from police-created danger).
99 71Ill. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147 (1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part & reinanded,
128 Ill. App. 2d 157, 262 N.E.2d 829, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971).
100 Id at 378, 219 N.E.2d at 150.
101 Id at 379, 219 N.E.2d at 150.
102 Id at 380, 219 N.E.2d at 150.
91

92
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tiff.10 3 In Ellsworth v. City of Racine,10 4 the Seventh Circuit noted that
a municipality creates a special relationship giving rise to a duty of
protection when a municipality puts an individual in a position of
danger from private persons.1 0 5 Although the plaintiff, an undercover policeman, failed to establish the existence of a special relationship with the municipality based on his occupation, the court
held that a limited special relationship, and therefore, a limited duty
of protection, existed between the plaintiff-as witness-and the
municipality. 106
Post-DeShaney case law emphasizes unilateral government
action endangering citizens and defines special relationship to include noncustodial situations and attenuated custodial relationships. When identifying special relationships, courts have deemed
the involuntary position in which the government places citizens
07
more dispositive than a strict definition of physical custody.
IdJ
774 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986).
105 Id. at 185. The Ellsworth court found that only a limited special relationship existed between the city and the plaintiff undercover police officer, and this limited relationship did not create an exhaustive duty of protection. Note, however, that the Ellsworth
plaintiff argued that a special relationship existed because of his status as a municipal
police officer and not because he was a witness. Id.
Other pre-DeShaney 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases holding that no special relationship
exists between government and witness can be distinguished on their facts. In Bernstein
v. Lower Moreland Township, 603 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Pa. 1985), the court stated that
city government had no constitutional duty to protect a witness, because the government had no authority to protect someone who resided outside the city's jurisdiction.
Id- at 911-12. However, the court stated in a footnote that the 1982 federal Victim and
Witness Protection Act created a special relationship between witnesses and the federal
government and established consequent legal rights and obligations. Id. at 911 n.3. In
Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989), the court
held that, in 1981 and 1982, no special relationship existed between a witness and the
federal government. The court, however, expressed no opinion as to whether a special
relationship would exist in light of subsequent case law. Id. at 102; cf Bergmann v.
United States, 689 F.2d 789 (8th Cir. 1982) (no special relationship exists between government and persons injured by a person placed in the federal Witness Protection program); Jet Indus., Inc. v. United States, 777 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1985) (selection and
supervision of witnesses in Witness Protection program a discretionary function), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986) ; Taitt v. United States, 770 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1985)
(government not liable for injuries caused by participant in Witness Protection program); Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1980) (decision to release people from Witness Protection program is discretionary), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981).
106 See discussion of Ellsworth, supra note 105.
1O7
It should be clear from the preceding discussion of post-DeShaney case law that
the "snake pit" theory of special relationships has survived DeShaney. See also Gregory v.
City of Rogers, 921 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that, after DeShaney, a special
relationship can exist between the government and persons killed after the police removed a "designated driver" from their car); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that, after DeShaney, a special relationship existed between the
government and citizens injured by a dangerous police officer, because the government
trained and armed the officer, thereby endangering the citizens); Crosby v. Luzerne
County Hous. Auth., 739 F. Supp. 951 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (stating that, after DeShaney,
103
104
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Under post-DeShaney case law, a special relationship thus exists between the government and a threatened federal criminal witness.
The existence of this special relationship creates a nondiscretionary
duty of protection because a duty, by definition, mandates specific
action and vitiates discretion.
2.

Reciprocal Duty of Protection

Principles of reciprocity dictate that both parties in a government-witness relationship assume equal but unique responsibilities.
The witness's duty to testify honestly gives rise to a reciprocal governmental duty to protect the witness. This duty of protection when
breached supports an actionable claim. As in a contractual relationship, the parties rely on each other to fulfill certain expectations.
The government relies on witnesses to 'testify honestly and witnesses, in turn, must be able to rely on the government for
protection.
Case law recognizes this reciprocal governmental duty to protect threatened witnesses. Nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court
first acknowledged a citizen's right to testify free from harassment in
In re Quarles.'08 In Quarles, a citizen, Henry Worley, informed a
United States Deputy Marshal of George Terry's illegal liquor distillation, whereupon Terry allegedly assaulted and threatened to kill
Worley. 10 9 Terry was charged with injuring, oppressing, threatening, and intimidating Worley in the "free exercise.., of a right and
privilege (the right to report violations of the law) secured to him by
10
the Constitution and laws of the United States."
Terry challenged his conviction by claiming that there was no
statutory or constitutional right to report lawbreaking."' In response to Terry's argument, Justice Gray, writing for the Court,
stated:
The right of a citizen informing of a violation of law . . .to be
protected against lawless violence, does not depend upon any of
the Amendments to the Constitution, but arises out of the creation and establishment by the Constitution itself of a national government .... [The right and duty of a citizen to assist in the
special relationships exist when citizens are placed in a worse position because of state
action); Ward v. City of San Jose, 737 F. Supp. 1502, 1507 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (under
DeShaney, government liable for danger it created); Amy Sinden, In Search of Affirmative
Duties Toward Children Under a Post-DeShaney Constitution, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 227 (1990)
(arguing that the "snake pit" line of cases is consistent with DeShaney's apparent requirement of involuntary submission to state action in finding a special relationship between
citizen and state).
158 U.S. 532 (1895).
108
109 Id at 532-33.
110 Id,at 532.
III

Id
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prosecution of any breach of the peace in the United States] are
privileges and immunities arising out of12 the nature and essential
character of the national government. 1
Justice Gray implied that the government owed a moral obligation
to protect a citizen witness. In addition to the constitutional protection afforded by the privileges and immunities clause," l8 Justice
Gray believed that witness protection and effective government
were inseparable. "[I]t is the duty of [the] government to see that
[the witness] may exercise this right freely, and to protect him from
[and this
violence while so doing, or on account of so doing ....
' 4
itself.""
government
...
of
necessity
the
from
duty arises]

Courts have followed Quarles's reciprocity rationale to impose
liability on the government for failing to protect witnesses. In Swanner v. United States 115 a government special employee/informant received death threats against himself and his family prior to his
scheduled testimony about illegal liquor distillation activities.16
The government knew of the threats, and advised Swanner, the informant, that he would be safe without protection if he remained at
his home, which Swanner did. 1 17 Shortly thereafter, a bomb exploded in Swanner's house, seriously injuring him and his family. 18
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama held that
the discretionary function exception did not bar Swanner's claim because the government owed him a special duty of protection resulting from his assistance to the prosecution.1 9 The government had
a duty to protect Swanner in return for Swanner's duty to testify
because "it had reasonably appeared to [federal] agents .

.

. that

120
Swanner... was endangered."'
Schuster v. New York 12' is one of the most frequently cited cases
in which government liability arose from a breach of the reciprocal
duty of protection owed to a witness. Arnold Schuster recognized a
fellow subway passenger as Willie Sutton, a notorious criminal
sought by law enforcement agencies, and immediately reported this

Id. at 536 (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448 (1890)).
Id The privileges and immunities clause provides that "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
114 Id. at 536 (quoting Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884)).
115
309 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
116 Id. at 1186.
112
113

117

Id.

118

Id.

119

Id. at 1187-88.
Id. at 1187.
5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).

120
121
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information to the New York City police department.1 22 Schuster's
help was crucial to Sutton's arrest, from which Schuster gained public acclaim.1 23 Thereafter, Schuster received numerous death
threats. 24 He notified the police, who assured Schuster that the
threats were not serious.' 25 Three weeks later Schuster was shot
and killed. 126 The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court dismissed the wrongful death action brought by Schuster's
survivors against the City of New York, stating that the city owed
27
Schuster no duty of protection.'
The New York Court of Appeals reversed and held that the municipality had a special duty to reasonably protect citizen witnesses
who were endangered as a result of their collaboration with the police. 128 "[W]here persons actually have aided in the apprehension
or prosecution of enemies of society under the criminal law," the
court said,"a reciprocal duty arises on the part of society [the municipality] to use reasonable care for their police protection."' 29 The
reciprocal duty to protect arose when Schuster became a witness
30
and would not arise in favor of a member of the general public.'
31
Reciprocity mandated an affirmative duty to protect Schuster.'
In Crain v. Krehbiel,'32 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California held that a federal agent's threat to
withdraw protection from an informant if the informant did not testify established a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 33 The court stated that the mere exercise of discretion by
122
Id at 79, 154 N.E.2d at 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 268; see also Note, Municpal Tort
Liability, supra note 12, at 605.
123
5 N.Y.2d at 79, 154 N.E.2d at 536, 180 N.Y.S.2d. at 268.
124 Id
125 Id.; see also Note, Municipal Tort Liability, supra note 12, at 605.
126 5 N.Y.2d at 79, 154 N.E.2d at 536, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
127 5 N.Y.2d at 76, 154 N.E.2d at 536, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
128 5 N.Y.2d at 80-81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
129 5 N.Y.2d at 81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 270; see also Morris v. Musser,
84 Pa. Commw. 170, 174, 478 A.2d 937, 940 (1984) (acknowledging that reciprocity
imposes a special duty of protection on police to protect individuals endangered as a
result of cooperation as informers or witnesses).
130 5 N.Y.2d at 81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
131
See also Estate of Tanasijevich v. City of Hammond, 178 Ind. App. 669, 383
N.E.2d 1081 (1978). In Tanasijevich, an Indiana appellate court held that a municipality
had a reciprocal duty to protect a citizen's property if it reasonably appeared that property damage would result from the citizen's cooperation with the police. The court said
that the general duty of protection owed to the public "becomes particularized to [a]
citizen who, in the interests of the general welfare, has placed individual or family wellbeing in jeopardy." Id at 674, 383 N.E.2d at 1084.
132
443 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
133
Id In addition to upholding the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court implied that, had it been presented with the question of the informant's
constitutional rights as an informant, it would have found a violation of those rights
under United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1976) (right to be a witness
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government agents did not cloak them with immunity.13 4 Therefore, they had no privilege to breach a duty owed to the informant.
The agents' actions, the court noted, constituted a "tortious breach
8 5
of the duty to protect informants."'
These cases demonstrate that the government owes its witnesses a reciprocal duty of protection in return for their cooperation
in a criminal proceeding. The bilateral government-witness relationship entails reciprocal duties which eliminate governmental discretion to not protect a witness.' 3 6 The government, in other
words, must assume a duty of protection corresponding to a witness's duty to testify.
3.

Knowledge

The government's special knowledge of danger posed to a potential witness heightens the government's duty to protect. When
the government knows that a criminal defendant with violent tendencies has threatened witnesses or may harm witnesses, the government cannot stand idly by under the umbrella of discretion. To
argue that the government has discretion to withhold protection
from witnesses in the face of a known danger is akin to arguing that
a fireman has discretion to ignore the smell of smoke. The government is the only actor on whom witnesses can rely for protection,
and the government is in the best position to be cognizant of potential danger posed to witnesses. The rationale for imposing this special duty of protection is largely premised upon one party's unique
ability to prevent tortious harm to another by virtue of relationshipbased knowledge,' 3 7 as articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
secured by the Constitution), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977). See also United States v.
Pacelli, 491 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1974) (same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974); In re
Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
134 Crain, 443 F. Supp. at 213.
135 Id. at 214; see also Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 623 n.35 (2d Cir.
1980) (noting that the government may be liable for failing to adequately protect a witness from reprisals), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981); Miller v. United States, 530 F.
Supp. 611, 613, 615 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (noting that there was "no easy answer" whether
the decision to protect witnesses was immunized by the discretionary function exception, and characterizing discretionary function exception case law as a "patchwork
quilt").
136
Duty by definition entails no discretion. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct.
2430, 2435 n.5 (1990) (" 'Discretionary acts do not give rise to liability because they are
not tortious. By definition, one who has discretion to act has no duty to act' ") (quoting
Penthouse, Inc. v. Saba, 399 So. 2d 456, 458 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)); Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 649 (1980) (municipality has no discretion to violate duties imposed on it by the Constitution).
137
By analogy, psychiatrists owe a duty to people whom the psychiatrists know to be
endangered by their patients' conduct, because knowledge gained from the doctor-patient special relationship places psychiatrists in a unique position to warn potential tort
victims. See, e.g., Currie v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 1074 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (psychia-
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Section 302B of the Restatement provides that "[a]n act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct
of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even
though such conduct is criminal."' 3 8
The classic knowledge case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University
of California139 illustrates the Restatement principle. In Tarasoff, the
California Supreme Court held that a psychiatrist owed a duty to
warn a person whom the psychiatrist knew might be harmed-and
40
was subsequently murdered-by a patient of the psychiatrist.'
The court held that psychiatrists "incur[] an obligation to use rea14 1
sonable care to protect the [foreseeable] victim [of] ... danger"
because psychiatrists possess unique professional skill and stand in a
42
unique position to ascertain an individual's potential for harm.1
14 3
Similarly, in Irwin v. Town of Ware,
the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that a police officer who knew that a motorist
was intoxicated had a duty to remove the motorist from the highway
to prevent potential injury to other citizens. 14 4 The court noted that
special governmental duties of protection are based in large part on
foreseeability, or knowledge, of harm posed to citizens by government inaction.' 4 5 The police officer knew the driver was intoxicated, 14 6 and, based on the officer's professional experience and
skill in dealing with intoxicated motorists, should have realized the
harm the driver posed to third parties.
In Horton v. Flenory,14 7 the Third Circuit held that a policeman
who knew of a private club owner's physical "interrogation" of a
club employee had a duty to protect the employee, even though departmental policy mandated acquiescence regarding certain private
disputes.' 48 Again, as in Irwin, the policeman knew that serious
trist's duty not limited to easily foreseeable victims), aft'd, 836 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1987);
Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980) (psychiatrist owes duty
to persons reasonably endangered by patient's violence to take reasonable precautions
to protect those parties); Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d
334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (a special relationship between psychiatrists and victim or
perpetrator may create liability); and discussion infra text accompanying notes 141-42.
138 RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 302B (emphasis added).
139 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
140 Id
141 Id at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
142 Id.
143 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984).
144 Id
145
Id. at 756, 467 N.E.2d at 1300; see also Bernstein v. Lower Moreland Township,
603 F. Supp. 907, 910 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (noting that knowledge of a special danger to
others may create a special relationship).
146 Irwin, 392 Mass. at 763-65, 467 N.E.2d at 1304-05.
147 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989).
148 Id at 458.
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harm was imminent, if not already present, 149 and this knowledge
created a nondiscretionary duty to protect.
Other cases hold that knowledge creates a governmental duty
to warn individuals who may be endangered by the conduct of
others. Although these cases do not address the issue of protection,
their reasoning nevertheless supports the imposition of a duty of
protection, because knowledge places the government in a unique
position and creates a duty which cannot be shirked. In Rieser v.
District of Columbia,15 for example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the discretionary function exception did not render immune the District of Columbia's decision to
secure employment for a paroled sex offender in an apartment complex who subsequently raped and murdered the plaintiff-decedent.' 5 ' The court found that the parolee's parole officer knew that
the parolee would be in close proximity to female tenants of the
complex, and, therefore, had no discretion to withhold information
of the parolee's prior sex-related crimes from the parolee's potential
employer. 15 2 The parole officer's knowledge and position created a
duty to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm posed by the parolee
to the female tenants. The parole officer breached this duty of protection owed to the endangered female tenants by failing to disclose
the information.' 5 3
In Johnson v. State 154 the California Supreme Court held that the
California Youth Authority's failure to inform a foster parent of a
foster child's known violent and dangerous tendencies was not immunized under the state's discretionary function exception. 15 5 The
Youth Authority's knowledge of the foster child's violent tendencies
created a nondiscretionary duty to inform the foster parents of the
child's dangerous nature. 15 6 The state was uniquely in a position to
know of the danger posed by a "ward" to a third party. The court
added that "courts should not casually decree governmental immunity" because that would insulate practically all governmental decii at 457.
563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977), modifed on other grounds, 580 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (en banc).
151
Id. at 475.
152
Id. at 479.
153 Id at 479; see also Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 992 (5th Cir. 1989) (when a
union, because of its unique position, knows and foresees that a union member will
injure others, the union has a duty to prevent harm by not referring the potential wrongdoer to an unsuspecting employer), cert. grantedsub nom., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,
110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990).
154 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
155 Id at 786, 447 P.2d at 355, 73 Cal. Rptr at 243.
156 Id
149
150
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sions from liability. 15 7
Knowledge of danger posed to citizens, therefore, can create a
governmental duty of protection or heighten an existing special
duty of protection. Moreover, governmental knowledge of danger
to third parties illustrates the stark reality of governmental inaction
masquerading under the guise of discretion. Although special relationships and principles of reciprocity amply support a duty of protection, knowledge is the component of a special duty that most
compellingly calls into question the legitimacy of "discretionary"
decisions to withhold protection. A government that refuses to act
when it knows that its citizens are endangered is a government that
fails to govern. When the government attempts to cloak inaction
with the discretionary function exception, it is essentially saying that
its failure to govern is immune from liability. For the government to
argue that it had knowledge of a danger and decided not to act, or
that it had no knowledge of a danger despite its unique position,
strains credibility and perverts the purpose of the discretionary
function exception.
II
PIECHOWICZ V. UNITED STATES

A.

Facts

In Piechowicz v. United States, 158 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that the survivors of a murdered federal criminal
witness could not bring a wrongful death action against the United
States for failing to protect the witness after he was threatened.' 59
The government subpoenaed the witness, Scott Piechowicz,1 60 and
his wife Cheryl, to testify in the narcotics and firearms trial of
Anthony Grandison.' 6 ' The couple's testimony was integral to the
government's case because their positive identification of Grandison
established the crucial nexus between Grandison and certain incriminating evidence.1 62 Without the Piechowiczes' testimony,
157
158

69 Cal. 2d at 798, 447 P.2d at 363, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
885 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989).

159

Id

160 By all accounts, Scott Piechowicz was a law-abiding citizen who willingly accepted
his duty to testify. A close high school friend described Piechowicz as "the kind of guy
who, when everyone was getting drunk at parties, you could count on to drive you home.
He was the straightest guy I ever knew." Wash. Post, May 9, 1983, at A18, col. 4.
Piechowicz's high school journalism teacher remembered the former sports editor of the
school paper as "the kind of boy you'd want your own son to be like. You don't want to
say the All-American boy because that sounds so trite. But in this case it's true. He was
the boy next door." Id
161 Piechowiz , 885 F.2d at 1210.
162 Id On November 10, 1982, federal marshals arrested Anthony Grandison for
allegedly violating his parole from a five-year sentence for assaulting Drug Enforcement
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Grandison's motion to suppress the incriminating evidence would
have likely succeeded.
Immediately prior to the suppression hearing concerning the
contraband discovered in Grandison's hotel room, Grandison's
common-law wife approached Cheryl Piechowicz and said something approximating, "If you know what's good for you, you'll say
you've never seen [Grandison] before in your life."' 163 Cheryl
Piechowicz reported the threat to Drug Enforcement agent John
16 4
Ryan and to Assistant United States Attorney James Savage.
Both men were aware of Grandison's propensity for criminal and
violent action. Savage characterized Grandison as "potentially dangerous"' 165 and noted that "his readiness and willingness to use
deadly force in achieving his criminal ends" were established beyond a doubt. 16 6 Ryan, a former Baltimore city police officer, had
arrested Grandison twice, including one arrest for assault. 16 7 Ryan,
moreover, knew that Grandison had been indicted in 1979 in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland for obstructing a criminal investigation and conspiring to murder a Drug
68
Enforcement Agency informant/witness.
Nevertheless, Savage and Ryan deemed it unnecessary to report
the incident as a threat against the Piechowiczes and made no effort
agents. Id. at 1209-10. A search of Grandison immediately following his arrest produced a key to a room at Baltimore's Warren House Hotel. Id In the meantime, a female associate of Grandison's accosted Scott Piechowicz, manager of the Warren House,
and demanded entrance into Grandison's room at the hotel which was registered under
the name of another Grandison associate. Memorandum to United States Probation Department from James C. Savage, case no. 82-00501, at 2 (May 27, 1983) [hereinafter
Memorandum]. Piechowicz refused to allow the woman in the room without permission. Piechowicz, 885 F.2d. at 1210. To secure Grandison's permission, Piechowicz
called a number the woman gave him and found himself talking to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Id.
Piechowicz then entered Grandison's room and saw drug paraphernalia and a revolver in two separate bags. Id. A subsequent FBI search of a locked third bag uncovered 122 grams of cocaine and 100 grams of heroin worth over $350,000, as well as four
pounds of cutting substances. Memorandum, supra, at 3. Cheryl Piechowicz was also a
Warren House employee. Piechowicz, 885 F.2d at 1210.
163
Piechowicz, 885 F.2d. at 1210.
164
Id.
165
Deposition of James Savage, at 23 (Apr. 1, 1987).
166 Memorandum, supra note 162, at 5. Others echoed Savage's assessment of
Grandison's violent nature. Assistant United States Attorney Mark Kolman stated, "No
one ... is as evil as Anthony Grandison .... People like [Grandison] should be put away
forever." United Press Int'l, Dec. 15, 1983 (NEXIS, OMNI Lib.). Assistant United
States Attorney Ty Cobb stated that Grandison was a "master of manipulation" who
"creates" heroin users. Wash. Post, May 12, 1983, at B3, col. 3.
167 Deposition ofJohn Ryan, at 14-15 (Apr. 2, 1987).
168 Id. at 4-5. Grandison was indicted on obstruction ofjustice charges for attempting to murder a federal witness scheduled to testify against Walter R. "Gangster" Webster, a kingpin of a multimillion-dollar Baltimore drug operation. United Press Int'l,
Apr. 29, 1983 (NEXIS, OMNI Lib).
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to protect them. 16 9 The Piechowiczes' only protection was a warning against threatening witnesses issued to all persons present at the
70
suppression hearing.1
Five days before Grandison's trial, a hired assassin shot and
killed Scott Piechowicz and his sister-in-law with a silenced machine
17 1
gun, apparently mistaking the sister-in-law for Piechowicz's wife.
B.

The District Court's Holding

Cheryl Piechowicz brought a wrongful death action in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland against the
United States Government, Assistant United States Attorney Savage, and drug enforcement agent Ryan for breaching their duty to
protect Scott Piechowicz.' 72 The district court held that the decision to withhold protection from Scott Piechowicz was discretionary
and dismissed Cheryl Piechowicz's complaint for failing to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. 7 3 In dicta, the court
noted that the government did have a special relationship with Scott
Piechowicz in light ofJensen v. Conrad,'7 4 but felt the relationship was
too nebulously defined to give rise to an affirmative right to
175
protection.
Pieckowic, 885 F.2d at 1210.
jd.
171
IL Vernon Evans, the hired killer, also conspired with Grandison to kill the witness who was scheduled to testify against Walter Webster in 1979 in Maryland. Deposition ofJohn Ryan, at 4-5 (Apr. 2, 1987).
Evans visited Grandison in jail two days before the slaying and was promised $9000
by Grandison for "pulling it off." Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 1983, at C5, col. 1. Grandison
wrote his common-law wife, Janet Moore, that "no one can put me there (the hotel
room)" but said he wanted Evans to "take care of something to be on the safe side."
United Press Int'l, Aug. 17, 1983 (NEXIS, OMNI Lib.).
Grandison was convicted of first-degree murder, witness tampering, and conspiring
to violate civil rights, in addition to his drug conviction, and was sentenced to death.
Grandison v. United States, 780 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1985); United Press Int'l, Nov. 1,
1990 (NEXIS, OMNI Lib.). Evans was convicted of the same charges. Id Janet Moore
and Rodney Kelly, who aided in the murder, were convicted of witness tampering and
civil rights violations. Grandison, 780 F.2d at 439.
For exhibiting special bravery in securing Grandison's conviction, then-FBI Director William Webster awarded Scott and Cheryl Piechowicz the Louis E. Peters Memorial
Service Award. Webster said that witnesses such as the Piechowiczes are "more than
important witnesses for the prosecution. [They] are themselves testimony to the moral
fiber and patriotism that are America's strength." United Press Int'l, Oct. 27, 1984
(NEXIS, OMNI Lib.).
172
Piechowicz v. United States, 685 F. Supp. 486 (D. Md. 1988).
173 Id. at 491-92.
174 Id.; see also supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
175
The district court stated that the "precise contours of a special relationship
which give rise to an affirmative right to protection by the state were not clearly established by governing case law." Piechowicz, 685 F. Supp. at 492.
169

170
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The Fourth Circuit's Holding

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit relied on the discretionary function exception and affirmed the district court's dismissal of Cheryl Piechowicz's wrongful death action. 176 The court
applied the two-part Berkovitz discretionary function test 177 to immunize the challenged governmental conduct.' 78 Addressing the first
Berkovitz criterion (i.e., whether the action involved an element of
judgment or choice), the Fourth Circuit found that federal witness
protection statutes and regulations granted agents considerable discretion in deciding "whether and how" to protect witnesses. 179 Title 9 of the United States Attorneys Manual-Criminal Division
("the Manual")1 80 authorizes the Attorney General "to offer to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of witnesses ... whenever, in
his judgment, testimony from, or a willingness to testify by, such a
witness would place his life or person ... in jeopardy."' 8'1 The absence of a specific directive and the presence of a personal judgment
sufficiently imbued the government's decision with discretion to satisfy the first part of the Berkovitz test.
The Fourth Circuit again relied on the Manual in concluding
that the decision to withhold protection from the Piechowiczes involved sufficient public policy considerations and therefore satisfied
the second Berkovitz criterion.' 8 2 The Manual requires the "responsible agents" to consider a witness's importance to the prosecution
and assess the adequacy of local protection before deciding whether
the witness deserves federal protection. 8 3 The court concluded
that the decision to leave the Piechowiczes without any protection
was, "in the broad sense," 18 4 a determination of whether protection
was "advantageous to the federal interest, and was accordingly one
freighted with policy overtones." 18 5 Therefore, the government was
not liable for failing to protect Scott Piechowicz.' 86 In addition, the
Fourth Circuit found that no special relationship existed because
the government never took the Piechowiczes into custody, and
hence, no duty was breached by government inaction.1 87 Citing
DeShaney, the court found that only persons "affirmatively restrained
176

177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184

Piechowicz v. United States, 885 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir. 1989).
See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
Piechowicz, 885 F.2d at 1211-12.
Id. at 1212.
Id.
Id.

See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
Piechowicz, 885 F.2d at 1213.
Id.

185

Id.

186
187

Id.
The court discussed the special relationship only in regard to Savage's and
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by the United States from acting on their own behalf" are owed
8
protection.'
III
ANALYSIS

The involuntary special relationship between the government
and witnesses entails xeciprocal obligations and creates a duty of
protection that is triggered when the government knows or should
know of a threat posed to witness safety. A breach of this special
duty of protection should give rise to a valid claim against the government by an injured federal criminal witness or his survivors.
A.

The Special Duty of Protection Owed to Government
Witnesses
1.

The Special Relationship Between Government and Witness

The background discussion of special relationships demonstrates that the government owes a duty of protection to individuals
involuntarily endangered by unilateral governmental action. PostDeShaney case law, consistent with the "snake pit" line of cases, argues against making physical custody the dispositive element in determining whether a special relationship exists between the
government and witnesses. Instead, these cases hold that a special
relationship giving rise to a duty of protection is created when the
government affirmatively endangers citizens.' 8 9 An involuntary special relationship is created when the government compels citizens to
testify for the prosecution in a criminal proceeding. A federal criminal witness faces potential injury at the hands of those to whom the
witness's testimony is most damaging; there is no risk of injury absent governmental action in compelling testimony. The government, by throwing citizen witnesses into a snake pit, assumes a duty
of protection which cannot be abandoned.
Unilateral governmental action that forces citizens into a potentially dangerous situation is the common denominator in snake pit
special relationship cases. In Swader v. Virginia,' 90 the government
required the decedent to live near a dangerous situation; in Stoneking
v. BradfordArea School District 191 and Pagano by Pagano v. Massapequa
Ryan's qualified immunity, and did not appraise it vis-i-vis the discretionary function
exception.
188 Id. at 1215; see also supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
189 See supra notes 81-107 and accompanying text.
190 743 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1990); see supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
191 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 840 (1990); seesupra notes 8890 and accompanying text.
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Public Schools,19 2 the government required students to attend school,
thereby exposing them to harm by other students and teachers; in
Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake,19 3 the government placed prisoners near townspeople; in Wood v. Ostrander,19 4 the government abandoned a stranded motorist; and, in G-69 v. Deghan, t9 5 the
government exposed an informant-witness's identity. In each of
these post-DeShaney cases, the government unilaterally endangered
citizens and left them defenseless, without government protection.
Accordingly, because the government can unilaterally endanger a
citizen through the power of subpoena, a special government-witness relationship is created that gives rise to a duty of protection.
For purposes of special relationship analysis, no difference exists
between the government abandoning a stranded motorist, for example, and the government abandoning a threatened witness. In both
situations, the government has placed the citizen in a position of
danger, and assumes a duty to use due care in ensuring the citizen's
safety.
Furthermore, even a strict interpretation of DeS haney leads to
the conclusion that a special relationship exists between the government and witnesses. In DeShaney, Joshua DeShaney's release from
state custody was crucial to the Supreme Court's analysis. The
Court reasoned that because Joshua was not in state custody at the
time of his beatings, no special relationship existed between Joshua
and the government that would create a duty of protection. Joshua
had the same relation to the government as any ordinary citizen,
and no governmental duty of protection arose.
Conversely, the federal government never released Scott
Piechowicz from "custody."' 196 Rather, the government continued
to restrain him from acting on his own behalf, 9 7 Only the government could sever its special relationship with Piechowicz, 9 8s and
192
714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
193 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1784 (1990); see supra notes
93-95 and accompanying text.
194
879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 341 (1990); see supra notes 9698 and accompanying text.
195
745 F. Supp. 254 (D.N.J. 1990); see supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
196 Black's Law Dictionary notes that "custody" "is very elastic and may mean ...

mere power... of taking manual possession." BLACK's LAW DicToNARY 384 (6th ed.

1990). The government clearly has the power to take possession of a threatened witness, as reflected in the Attorney General's Manual and in the Witness Protection program. See supra text accompanying notes 180-83; see infra note 204.
197 Piechowicz v. United States, 885 F.2d 1207, 1214-15 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)). For further discussion of DeShaney, see supra notes 72-77, 84-86, 107, 188-96 and accompanying
text.
198 Piechowicz could have ended the relationship by refusing to testify and risk being held in contempt of court. Clearly, that was not a viable option.
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therefore only the government could lawfully ensure Piechowicz's
safety. Piechowicz was powerless to withdraw from the relationship
and provide for his own safety. He had no choice but to testify, even
though the government endangered his life by subpoenaing him to
testify. Like a prisoner to whom the government owes a duty of protection from other prisoners, 9 9 the government owed Piechowicz a
duty of protection because its actions brought him into a relationship which Piechowicz could not end and the government chose not
to end. In a very important sense, Piechowicz, unlike Joshua
DeShaney, was functionally in the government's custody.
In addition, a special relationship exists between the government and witnesses in Piechowicz-type situations under the Fourth
Circuit's definition articulated in Jensen v. Conrad.20 0 Under Jensen,
the government creates a special relationship with a citizen if three
criteria are satisfied. First, "either the perpetrator or the victim
must have been in legal custody at the time of the incident." 20 1
Piechowicz satisfies this requirement because the perpetrator,
Grandison, was incarcerated at the time of the incident. 20 2 Second,
Jensen declares that the government must have "expressly stated its
desire to provide affirmative protection to a particular class or specific individuals. '2 03 Piechowicz satisfies this requirement because the
federal government expressed its desire to protect threatened witnesses by creating the Witness Protection Program. 2 04 Finally,
under Jensen, the government must have known of the claimant's
plight.20 5 Piechowicz satisfies this requirement because the government, through Ryan and Savage, knew that Grandison had previously attempted to murder witnesses, and had threatened the
Piechowiczes. Application of theJensen test establishes that the federal government has a special relationship with witnesses like
199 United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963) (government liable for injuries to
prisoner who was beaten by other prisoners); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307
(1982) (mental institution must take action to ensure patient's safety from other patients); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (special relationship between prison officials and inmates).
200 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
201
202

Id at 194 n.ll.
Arguably Piechowicz was also in government custody. See supra notes 196-97 and

accompanying text.
203
204

Jensen, 747 F.2d at 195 n.11.
18 U.S.C. § 3521 (1988). The Witness Protection Program authorizes the Attor-

ney General to provide for the relocation and protection of witnesses and potential witnesses if he determines that a serious offense against a witness is "likely to be
committed." Id. § 3521 (a)(1); see also Bernstein v. Township of Lower Moreland, 603 F.
Supp. 907, 911 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (stating that the Witness Protection Program estab-

lishes a special relationship between the witness and the government).
205

Jensen, 747 F.2d at 195 n.l1.
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Piechowicz. 2 06
Nevertheless, in Piechowicz the Fourth Circuit ignoredJensen and
instead reached a result with inequitable consequences, because
under the court's interpretation of DeShaney, Anthony Grandison
can sue the government but Cheryl Piechowicz cannot. Grandison,
as a prisoner in government custody affirmatively restrained from
acting on his own behalf, could maintain a due process claim against
20 7
the government for failing to provide adequate medical care.
Cheryl Piechowicz, however, could not sue the government for failing to protect her husband because, as the Fourth Circuit held, no
special relationship existed between her husband and the government. Such an ironic scenario illustrates the weakness of the Fourth
Circuit's rationale in Piechowicz. Instead of recognizing the special
relationship between witnesses and the government, the court limits
special relationships to narrowly defined custodial situations, and
unjustly denies relief to the survivors of murdered federal criminal
witnesses.
2.

The Reciprocal Duty of Protection

The bilateral government-witness relationship involves reciprocal obligations. The witness has a legal obligation to testify, and in
return, the government owes a duty of protection should the witness
be endangered as a result of his cooperation. In other words, a
threatened witness deserves protection for his performance of a
legal duty that has jeopardized his life.
The government-witness relationship is perhaps best characterized in this sense as quasi-contractual. Both parties act in reliance
on certain reciprocal expectations of performance. The government's obligation within the "contract" should be a duty of protection, and, accordingly, a breach of this duty should give rise to an
20 8
action in tort.
206 Jeen apparently encompasses nonreciprocal relationships, such as a state-prisoner relationship. Here, state statutes have mandated minimally acceptable prison conditions, such as maximum occupancy when the state recognized that a minimum-security
prisoner in the state's legal custody was endangered by sharing a cell with a maximumsecurity prisoner. In such a situation, reciprocity does not exist between the prisoner
and the state, because the prisoner's only obligation is to serve a sentence. Moreover,
unlike a witness, a prisoner confers no real benefit on the state; indeed, the prisoner
ultimately caused his own "plight." Yet underJensen, a state-prisoner special relationship still exists.
207
See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (states must provide adequate
medical care to prisoners), reh'g denied, 428 U.S. 1066 (1977); cf Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307 (1982) (involuntarily committed mental patients have a due process right
to services necessary to ensure their reasonable safety).
208 The contractual analogy is used merely to illustrate the reciprocal duties in the
government-witness relationship and is not to be construed as a separate basis for
liability.
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To paraphrase Quarles, a moral obligation to protect threatened
criminal witnesses is consistent with quasi-contractual duties as an
aspect of reciprocity. 20 9 The reciprocity rationale of Quarks,
Schuster, and Swanner clearly recognizes witnesses' importance to the
criminal justice system by imposing a special duty of protection on
the government. 210 These cases argue that it is simply unjust for
governments to impose a legal obligation on witnesses to testify
without imposing a concomitant governmental duty of protection.211 A government that demands sacrifices from its citizens
without providing anything in return resembles a totalitarian regime. Even taxation, perhaps one of the less palatable characteristics of a democracy, is not inherently unilateral, because in return
for paying taxes, citizens receive a sound infrastructure, education,
health insurance, and, essentially, most of the benefits of a civilized
society. Witness protection may be one of the few areas where the
government unilaterally demands sacrifices from its citizens-and
indeed endangers its citizens-without any manifestation or acknowledgement of a reciprocal duty. The case law discussed earlier
demonstrates that the government should assume a reciprocal duty
of protection. In fact, this case law strongly argues for governmental assumption of a reciprocal duty of protection particularly in the
context of the government-witness relationship. Witnesses are so
crucial to the administration ofjustice that assumption of a reciprocal duty is perhaps more important than in other areas in which re2
ciprocal duties exist. 12
Moreover, the government's reciprocal duty of protection
removes subsequent governmental action from the realm of discretion because "duty" is mandatory. 2 13 A duty is not something one
decides to undertake after assessing a situation, or something one
does incompletely; a duty is imperative. In recognizing reciprocal
duties, tort law strives to encourage the exercise of reasonable care
where clearly defined expectations and obligations between two parties exist. The government and subpoenaed witnesses are just such
parties.
In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); see supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
Id Swanner v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Schuster v.
New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958); see supra notes 115-31
and accompanying text.
211
The federal government already recognizes a similar reciprocal relationship with
soldiers by compensating wounded veterans and the survivors of military personnel
killed in the line of duty. Veterans' Benefits Act 38 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). The rationale
for compensating soldiers applies to federal criminal witnesses; government service
merits some form of reciprocal governmental obligation.
212
See supra text accompanying notes 56-68.
213
BLACK'S LAw DIcTioNARY 505 (6th ed. 1990) ("Duty" is defined as a "mandatory
obligation to perform.").
209
210
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Knowledge of a Threat to Witness Safety

Knowledge is the fuel that fires the government's special duty
to protect witnesses. When the government knows of a danger
posed to witnesses, the government must act to prevent the danger
because the government may be the only actor in a position to know
of the danger and act accordingly. Refusing to act, despite knowledge of a danger to a witness, is tantamount to actually injuring that
witness. When the government knew of Anthony Grandison's violent nature and propensity for witness tampering yet still failed to
act, the government might just as well have furnished the machine
gun that killed Scott Piechowicz.
Case law and the Restatement both emphasize the importance of
knowledge in imposing a duty to act. In Irwin v. Ware,2 14 the government knew that a drunk driver posed a danger to other motorists, and the government was therefore liable for failing to remove
the driver from the road. 2 15 In Horton v. Flenoiy,2 16 the government
knew that a citizen was being injured, and the government was
2 17
therefore liable for failing to stop the assault.
Governmental knowledge of a danger to witnesses is completely analogous to the foregoing cases. Knowing that a witness
may be harmed by a criminal defendant is no different from knowing that a motorist may be harmed by a drunk driver. Preventive
action is imperative in both situations, and if the government fails to
act, it should be liable for any ensuing harm. Such a view is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Restatement section
302B states that an actor is negligent for failing to prevent harm that
the actor "realizes or should realize" may occur. 2 18 Additionally,
section 319 provides that: "One who takes charge of a third person
whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to
others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care
to control the third person to prevent him from doing such
harm. ' 2 19 When the government, therefore, knows or should know
that a criminal defendant may harm a witness, the government has a
duty to prevent such harm. In Piechowicz, for example, Grandison's
criminal record, his prior attempt to assassinate a federal witness,
and his threats provided sufficient notice of his potential to do harm
and placed the government under a duty to protect the
214 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984).
215 Id. at 762, 467 N.E.2d at 1304-05. For further discussion of Irwin, see supra text
accompanying notes 143-46.
216 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989). For further discussion of Horton, see supra text

accompanying notes 147-49.
217 Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454, 459 (3d Cir. 1989).
218
RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 302B.
219 RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 319 (emphasis added).
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Piechowiczes. 220
Because the government-whether acting through policemen,
juvenile officers, parole officers, United States attorneys, or Drug
Enforcement agents-is in a unique position to know of the danger
posed by a third party to citizens, the government must be held liable for failing to take preventive action. Despite having physical
custody of a dangerous individual, the government cannot prevent a
person in custody from harming citizens, because, as in Piechowicz,
the person can hire an assassin. The government must therefore
fulfill its duty in an alternative manner: that manner is protection.
It is inequitable, unjust, and contrary to fundamental principles of
tort law to absolve the government of any responsibility for harm
caused to a witness when the government knew that such harm was
probable.

IV
CONCLUSION

Recognizing the government's special duty to protect its witnesses will encourage citizen-government collaboration and provide
for a more effective criminal justice system. The current state of
affairs leaves threatened federal criminal witnesses with undesirable
options if the government, as in Piechowicz, decides to withhold protection from witnesses in total disregard of the imminent dangers
they may face. A threatened criminal witness who has been subpoenaed to testify and has been denied protection has three options: he
can commit perjury; he can refuse to testify and risk contempt of
court; or, he can truthfully testify and risk death. The government
should strive to foster citizen cooperation to increase convictions
and create a safer society, rather than ignoring the obstacles placed
22 1
in the path of citizen participation in criminal prosecution.
Nevertheless, in Piechowicz, the Fourth Circuit held that a federal
criminal witness, a vital part of the criminal justice system, could be
ignored by the government he was legally obliged to serve. 2 22 Principles of reciprocity, the involuntary special relationship between
criminal witnesses and the government, and the government's
220 Piechowicz v. United States, 885 F.2d 1207, 1212 n.5 (4th Cir. 1989).
221 Courts are aware of the problems involved in failing to protect or compensate
criminal witnesses. "The present-day unwillingness of citizens to 'get involved' in the
machinations of law enforcement stems in part from their fear of reprisals." Estate of
Tanasijevich v. City of Hammond, 178 Ind. App. 669, 674, 383 N.E.2d 1081, 1085
(1978). The New York Court of Appeals observed that a failure to compensate deserving witnesses and their survivors "might well [make it] difficult to convince the citizen to
aid and cooperate with law enforcement." Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 81,
180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269, 154 N.E.2d 534, 537 (1958).
222 Piechowicz, 885 F.2d at 1209.

1316

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1285

knowledge of danger to a witness, however, create a duty of protection owed to a threatened witness that vitiates governmental discretion under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.
Deserving plaintiffs should be able to seek compensation through
the courts for a breach of the special governmental duty of protection. Holding the government liable will provide the necessary incentives to protect criminal witnesses.
For the present, the federal criminal witness appears to be the
forgotten soul of the criminal justice system, left unprotected by the
government he so ably serves. Certainly he deserves more.
R. Jeffrey Harris

